Genetically Modified Humans

Seeing as ultimately it is parents who get to decide, happily there can be no stopping this

Is modifying genes playing God, and should it be stopped?

A good question for sure. So often we hear the charge that some pursuit- particularly when new technology is involved-is tantamount to "playing God." This charge runs together two lines of thought that we need to separate if we are to do justice to the issue. First, there is what we might think of as the demarcation question: Do genetic modifications count as playing God? Second, there is the morality question: What reason is there for believing that it is wrong to play God? Let us take these in turn.

Is genetic modification playing God?

The demarcation question requires some way of classifying actions as either playing God or not playing God. The most extreme view is that any modification of genes counts as playing God. The glib answer here is that if this extreme view is correct then many of us our guilty of playing God, since sexual reproduction involves the modification of genes. Our genomes are unique composites formed from contributions from our mother and father. Presumably no one takes seriously such an extreme view, for then each of us would be an example of our parents having played God.

It is fair to say, then, that a less extreme view must be at issue. One such view is that modifying genes in any sort of planned manner is playing God, perhaps justified by the thought that to do so would be to attempt to design living beings according to our own precepts. This position must classify all forms of genetic engineering as playing God, as well as all forms of eugenics, as both activities involve genetic planning. On this criterion we would have to admit that most of our domestic animals and crops are a result of humans playing God. Every breed of dog has been selectively bred for certain traits, as have animals we use for food, such as cows, pigs and chickens. The fact that we are so comfortable using eugenic procedures on animals and plants, coupled with the fact that playing God is thought to be a serious charge, suggests that we ought to look for a more restrictive definition of what counts as playing God.

One possibility is to put aside the eugenic selection of animals, and instead focus exclusively on genetic engineering; thus, the criterion might be that all genetic engineering is a matter of playing God. To accept this means that genetically engineering viruses to make vaccines is a matter of playing God. Again, when we think of the good that flows from vaccines, and our general comfort level with the use of genetic engineering for such purposes, this suggests that this criterion cannot capture what is meant presently when we hear the accusation of playing God.

Some might be tempted to draw the line "higher" up the phylogenetic scale. While genetically engineering viruses and bacteria is not a matter of playing God, they might say, the engineering of plants, mammals or humans does constitute playing God. While not as uncontroversial as genetically engineering viruses and bacteria, many accept the benefits of such procedures on plants and animals, and so might choose to draw the distinction elsewhere. Even drawing the line at using genetic engineering on humans is not as unproblematic as it might first appear. There is much hope that genetic engineering might help with a number of genetic diseases, such as immune deficiencies that force children to live in "bubbles" for fear of contracting illnesses. It takes a rather stern heart to look at the lives of the children so confined and say that genetically modifying them is a matter of playing God. Similarly, there is hope for the development of genetic engineering therapies for such genetic diseases as cystic fibrosis and Huntington's. It is difficult to look at the suffering of individuals afflicted with these diseases and say that genetic therapies that might relieve their conditions are a matter of playing God.

The latest and perhaps last line of defense is to say that the playing God distinction is activated when genetic engineering is used for enhancement purposes on humans. That is, to repair genetic diseases is not a matter of playing God, but if we use genetic engineering to enhance humans we are playing God. If the future is like the past then there will be a few pioneers in one part of the world or another who will use genetic engineering for enhancement purposes. Our initial squeamishness will give way to a wider acceptance. At some point the playing God charge against human enhancement will seem less compelling, just as the playing God charge once leveled against genetically modifying bacteria has quieted.

The point I want to make here, then, is that there are a number of possible ways of demarcating the playing God acts from the not-playing God acts, and so we might quite rightly ask those who make the charge what counts as playing God and why. The point is not that there is a lack of distinction to be drawn here, but rather that there are many ways of drawing the distinction. As a matter of historical fact, there seems to be a "moving wall" of what counts as playing God. In the 1970s many thought that any form of genetic engineering-even genetic engineering of bacteria- was a matter of playing God, whereas very few would take seriously such a claim today. Presently, many find acceptable at least some forms of genetic engineering of plants, animals and even humans.

Which brings us to the morality question.

Is it wrong to play God?

So often those that make the indictment of playing God seem to assume that it is immediately obvious to everyone that there is something wrong with
playing God. However, a moment's reflection shows that it might not be as evident as it first appears.

The thinking behind the idea that there is something wrong with playing God seems to be something like this: There are realms of activity that are permitted for God and forbidden for humans, so to play God is to engage in activities in which only God should engage. Consider as a parallel sexual activity. Between consenting adults, sexual activity (in general) is not problematic, but the same sorts of activity between children may be very inappropriate. Children who do so are guilty of "playing adult." To draw the parallel: while it is entirely appropriate for God to modify life, it is impermissible for us to engage in such activity.

The trouble is that the view that playing God is wrong does not follow ineluctably from a belief in God. To see this, consider a slightly different analogy. Imagine a child taking on a new responsibility such as taking out the garbage-an activity formerly done exclusively by her parents. Here again we might think of this as playing adult, but be pleased that the child is taking on more responsibility. Playing God, then, might be considered a good thing, part of the maturation process of the human species. The ancient myth of Prometheus is perhaps a case in point. According to one version of the myth, Prometheus procured for humanity technology in order to increase our power. This angered Zeus, who feared the increased power, and he therefore punished both Prometheus and humanity. Prometheus seems to have actually encouraged humanity to play God, while Zeus did not approve. The followers of Prometheus then would see the claim of playing God as one of moral approval, whereas the followers of Zeus may see this as one of moral censure.

This same sort of controversy can be found in a religion that is more familiar to many of us, namely Christianity. Many Christians believe that we ought not to play God, even if they do not agree on the line of demarcation. Others, particularly in the Irenaean tradition of Christianity, believe that God wants us to play God with the material world-the world of plants and animals and even our own physical bodies-so that by our efforts we can exhibit our virtues as we try to make the world and our lives better. This is part of our development as we take on more responsibility for being the persons that we are. While it would take us to far afield to discuss this issue in detail, my point here simply is that even among the religious it is a matter of some controversy whether we should play God or not. To think otherwise is to dogmatically dismiss other religious views. (I discuss this more in my paper "The Problem of Evil Solved.")

There appears to me a tendency to overestimate and underestimate the scope of the playing God objection. In terms of overestimating the scope it is
sometimes suggested that unless we acknowledge that there are realms of activity only God should operate in, anything goes. In my view, it is a mistake to make this leap. In part, it looks as if some tend to think of the playing God objection as a catch-all for the view that there are moral limits to how we ought to remake life. Michael Sandel, professor of government at Harvard, appears to reason this way in his paper "What's Wrong with Enhancement":
Unlike accounts that emphasize the loss of human powers and the erosion of human agency, the hubris objection can explain our moral hesitation to embrace certain genetic alterations of animals. Chickens like to roam, but most egg-laying hens are confined, frustrated, in small battery cages. Suppose we could alter the gene that makes chickens want to run free. The chickens, now content to be confined, would suffer less frustration, and egg production would improve. Or suppose we found a way to dumb down cows to eliminate the fear they experience on their way to the slaughter chute. Or to engineer pigs without hooves, snouts, and tails. Is there anything troubling about altering animals in these ways? Let's assume that by reducing their capacities for our convenience we do not increase the animals' suffering, and may even relieve it. If these animal enhancements give us pause, it cannot be for reasons connected to the erosion of human agency. To the contrary, the genetic improvement of animals represents the ultimate human dominion. If such alterations are troubling, the reason must draw on the idea that life (even animal life) is a gift not subject without limit to our mastery or dominion.

What Sandel calls the "hubris objection" is what we have been referring to as playing God. In his discussion of Sandel's argument, the US President's Council on Bioethics chairman Leon Kass describes the equivalency of these two thoughts: "A common man-on-the-street reaction to these prospects is the complaint of 'men playing God.' An educated fellow who knows Greek tragedy complains rather of hubris."

The problem I see with Sandel's analysis lies in his claim that "we must draw on the idea that life (even animal life) is a gift not subject without limit to our mastery or dominion." Now, as we have said, this is equivalent to saying that the limits must draw on the idea of not playing God. But this seems false. There seem to be clear limits to what we might do that do not appeal to the idea of playing God. Think about Sandel's chickens. It is difficult to see what he has in mind here, but if the only choice is for a chicken to spend its life in a small battery, I'm not sure why it would be worse to genetically alter chickens to make their lives in the battery less miserable. We can admit this even if we believe that it would be better to make the living conditions for chickens better rather
than altering their genes. That is, perhaps the best life for a chicken involves running free rather than being genetically engineered to enjoy being cooped up. Of course, by hypothesis we cannot explain why such a life is better in terms of suffering, since Sandel allows that the genetically altered chickens will not suffer more (and may suffer less). However, we may explain this in terms of an appeal to autonomy: We think that animals that can exhibit a certain amount of independence and control over their lives are better off, other things being equal, than those that are completely dependent upon us.

The point, then, is that it is not clear that the idea of mastery or playing God here adds anything to the view that certain changes to animals are immoral. Consider another case. Clearly there are alterations to animals that ought to give us moral pause. Imagine, for example, genetically altering an animal such that its whole life would be one of agonizing pain. Suppose that somehow the pain receptors have been modified to always be on. Suppose further that the only benefit (assuming we see it as a benefit) is the pleasure some sadists might see in seeing the animal suffer. The suffering of the animal does not contribute to our knowledge, nor increase food production, nor serve any other acknowledged good. We do not need to appeal to arguments against playing God to prevent engineering animals that experience lifelong pain, we need only point out that such an act would be immoral because it promotes entirely gratuitous suffering.

As this example shows, it does not follow that if we don't accept the playing God objection then "everything is permitted." Some changes are wrong for moral reasons. In fact, one way to underscore this is to point out that it would be wrong for God to make animals that suffered their whole lives in agonizing pain, just as it would be wrong for humans. To think otherwise, as Sandel seems to, confuses the point of the playing God objection.

It is also possible to underestimate the scope of this objection. I agree with Sandel that the objection stems from "a religious sensibility. But its resonance reaches beyond religion." In other words, it would be a mistake (one that is often made, I might add) to infer from a commitment to atheism the conclusion that the playing God objection is irrelevant. I don't mean simply that atheists should respect the religious beliefs of others. Rather, I mean that atheists can still raise the playing God by reasoning hypothetically as follows: Because of the limited nature of our moral and intellectual capacities, it would be wrong for humans to use genetic engineering to enhance humans. This is not to say that it would be wrong for a being or beings with greater intellectual and moral nature to do so. If God existed, for example, it would not be wrong for God to genetically enhance us. But given our limited natures, it is wrong for us to do so.

This seems to me to be a perfectly consistent application of the playing God objection, one that does not depend on any belief in God, but merely makes us aware of the fact that we have limited nature. My point here, let me stress, is not that we should necessarily accept this argument, merely that this line of argument shows that the playing God objection does not depend on the belief in God.

If you have reached this point and think that I haven't answered the question of whether modifying genes is playing God and should be stopped, you are correct. We so often hear the assertion that modifying genes is tantamount to playing God, as if this settled the matter. Those who think the issue is so easily settled should ask how they are determining what constitutes playing God and why this is bad. Similarly, those who reject the objection because they don't believe in God should realize that the objection can stand regardless. My theme is that the issues here are less clear and more complex than one might be lead to believe.

Mark Walker is a research associate in philosophy at the University of Toronto's Trinity College, the editor-in-chief of the Journal of Evolution and Technology and a cofounder of Permanent End International, a nonprofit organization dedicated to eliminating world hunger, illiteracy and environmental degradation.

Originally: www.betterhumans.com/Features/Ask_an_Expert/answer.aspx?articleID=2004-03-16-1
 

Source: reason online
http://www.reason.com/rb/rb031004.shtml
(links to references to be found online)

Ronald Bailey, Reason's science correspondent, is the editor of Global Warming and Other Eco Myths (Prima Publishing) and Earth Report 2000: Revisiting the True State of the Planet(McGraw-Hill). His new book, Liberation Biology: An Ethical and Scientific Defense of the Biotech Revolution will be published by Prometheus later this year.

Is Cloning 'Pro-Life'?
By James Pinkerton
01/15/2003

Is human cloning controversial? Sure it is. But the most interesting argument isn't about whether Rael is for real; few believe that the white-suited, top-knotted Clonaid founder is a truth-teller. Rather, the most important divide, not yet entirely visible, is inside the anti-cloning camp. Put simply, the arguments made by the anti-cloners directly, albeit unintentionally, refute many of the arguments of the pro-lifers. Those internal contradictions within social conservatism could become an externalized breakdown in logic as the anti-cloners make yet another bid to enact banning legislation.

Wait a second, the reader might ask, "How could this be? How could the anti-cloners be pitted against the pro-lifers? After all, isn't it mostly the same folks-fundamentalist Christians, conservative Catholics, and a smattering of neoconservatives-who are leading the opposition to both procedures, abortion and cloning?" Yup, same folks. They argue, without realizing it, against themselves-yet another indicator of the tumultuous scientific and sexual tumbling that has occurred over the past few decades. That is, many of the arguments of the pro-lifers refute the arguments of the anti-cloners. Social conservatives, if they really thought about it, might be confused. Instead, they suffer from an unacknowledged schizophrenia, in which one lobe of social conservatism opposes the other.

Let's start by considering some of the arguments the anti-cloners make, then examine how the premises of the pro-lifers disagree with them, however unintended and seemingly ironic that disagreement might be.

Anti-Cloning Argument #1: "Cloned babies will be born with genetic defects that will damage the quality of their lives and shorten those lives." This is no doubt true, at least in the early stages of the technology; Dolly, for example, is prone to obesity. As for humans, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops argues that clones would suffer "unpredictable but devastating health problems."

Pro-Life Counter-Argument: The problem here is that pro-lifers fight for the birth of unwell or retarded babies; they oppose abortion no matter how severe the handicap. For example, there's "Down's Syndrome Parents For Life," a cyberspace support group for "parents of Down Syndrome children who are committed to eradicating the practice of aborting babies with Down's Syndrome." Indeed, a growing school of thought views such defects not as undesirable handicaps, but rather as a desirable form of "diversity," or even a valuable spur to spirituality. Martha Beck's autobiographical memoir, Expecting Adam: A True Story of Birth, Rebirth, and Everyday Magic, a steady seller five years after its publication, argues, in effect, that a Down's Syndrome child is a good thing since it encourages the "growth" of the parents. The anti-cloners/pro-lifers can't have it both ways. If cloning is bad because it creates defects, then bringing defective children into the world can't be good.

Anti-Cloning Argument #2: "Life will be destroyed in the process of cloning." Dolly the Cloned Sheep was one of 277 attempts; the other 276 did not survive. The Children of God for Life group, based in Clearwater, Florida, declares that the destruction of embryos in the creation of humans would be "selfish and cannibalistic."

Pro-Life Counter Argument: The pro-lifers want to defend life as they know it, but what is life? If one follows traditional Catholic dogma-that life begins at conception-one hits a huge problem: the clone has never been "conceived." That is, whereas a "traditional" embryo is the result of a sperm and egg uniting, a clone is simply a duplication of a single cell, its nucleus transplanted into an egg cell. So what makes it alive, and distinct from any other kind of cell? And for that matter, what makes it dead? Anti-cloners now say that a cloned embryo is a "potential life" and so must be protected, not discarded in the laboratory, as happened to Dolly's 276 brothers and sisters. Indeed, the notion of potential life resonates in Catholic thinking; concern for the loss of such "life" undergirded Catholic opposition to all forms of contraception. But if all potential life must be sheltered, then why not allow clones? After all, every cell today is a potential life.

Anti-Cloning Argument #3: "We are playing God, taking life into our hands." Roman Catholic Bishop Paul Loverde of Arlington, Va. asserts, "When man takes into his own hands the creative acts of God or the destruction of the creative acts of God, he is acting as God, and will succumb to the same fall as Eve and Adam in the Garden."

Pro-Life Counter Argument: OK, if "playing God" is so bad, then why aren't pro-lifers protesting In Vitro Fertilization (IVF)? Three decades ago, alarm bells went off about the prospect of IVF- "Frankenstein," "Rosemary's Baby," and so on. But since the healthy birth, on July 25, 1978, of Louise Brown, the first "test tube baby," the selecting of a fertilized egg for implantation into a mother's womb has been firmly and legally established; in the past quarter-century, some 50,000 American women have given birth through this technique. Indeed, the technique of IVF is worth dwelling upon, because its essence is improving the chances of implantation; that is, aiding in the attachment of the tiny embryo to the uterine wall. Only when such embedding occurs can pregnancy proceed. One might ask: should the attempt to do that embedding be regarded as for or against life? So IVF is the precursor to cloning; if the first out-of-the-womb child-bearing technique proved successful, then maybe the second out-of-the womb child-bearing technique will prove out, too. So when the anti- cloners say that the selection of life requires the destruction of life-and therefore, such selecting should be banned-they are seemingly on a collision course not just with the prospect of cloning but the on-the-ground reality of 300 clinics across the country that offer IVF. And in theory, the anti-cloners should be joined by the pro- lifers. But the pro-lifers long ago abandoned what little anti-IVF crusading they ever did.

Anti-Cloning Argument #4: "Cloning is eugenics-and not only that, it's Nazi-like." The conservative evangelical Chuck Colson wants a ban on all human cloning research, writing, "The lid on Pandora's box of unethical biotechnology has been raised. Now is the time to slam it back down and lock it tight." William L. Saunders of the Family Research Council is one of many anti-cloners to use the "n" word. In an essay, "Finding the Line Between Good and Evil: The Cloning of Human Beings in Light of the Nuremburg Code," he creates a syllogism: the Nazis used the world "therapeutic" to justify their evil schemes, and now pro-cloning scientists use the same word to defend what they do. Ergo, there's not much difference between Nazism in practice and cloning in practice.

Pro-Life Counter Argument: Nobody likes Nazis; today, those who throw around the "n" word are usually showing their own desperation. Yet utterly un-Hitlerian humans have been engaged in what might be called "soft" eugenics for eons, picking mates, or not, according to whatever physical characteristics they find desirable, reproducing without special medical technology. One might wonder: how much potential life has been lost through such romantic choosing? But if pro-lifers really want to protect all life, they should be outraged about the increasingly common practice of pre- implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). Using PGD, hopeful couples concerned over the risk of genetic defects-or who wish to select for sex-ask a doctor to create multiple fertilized embryos through IVF. After three days of growth, the DNA of each embryo is then examined, one is selected, and the rest destroyed. If one were of a certain turn of mind-that is, if one were to believe that each eight-cell clump is a human life-then laboratories where this occurs could indeed be compared to Nazi death camps. Do pro-lifers think this form of eugenics should be prohibited? If so, they should say so, and protest PGD clinics just like they protest abortion clinics. But the pro-lifers look the other way when it comes to PGD, perhaps because it is so difficult to overcome the yearning of would-be parents who merely wish to have a healthy child. Similarly, pro-lifers could advocate society take up the burden of protecting "surplus" eight-celled embryos, delivering them into life and rearing them into adulthood. Instead, the pro-lifers have made their peace with PGD process; yet in making such a peace, they have separated themselves from the anti-cloners, who cite just such embryo destruction as an argument against allowing cloning. And for that matter, if the anti-cloners really wanted to protect life, they would be out blockading PGD clinics today, not worrying about cloning centers tomorrow.

The fifth and final irony of the entire debate over cloning is that the reproductive technology being developed today is profoundly pro-life-in the largest sense. Think about it: the goal of all these efforts is the creation of new life. So while it would be easy to understand why the Zero Population Growthers would oppose technologically enhanced baby-making, the harder question is why the "pro-family" folks would oppose such innovations. If all life is precious, then why don't they want more of it?

Perhaps the answer goes back to the '60s, when modernizing lifestyle-liberators used technology, notably the Pill and surgical abortion, to foment a child-free sexual revolution. But now the situation has changed. Many of those same 60s revolutionaries are anxious to reverse the birth-dearth, and they are trying to apply technology to undo the baby-busting effects of what they wrought. The social conservatives could simply say to these folks, "See, we told you so! Children are good!" But instead, the anti-cloner/pro-lifers seem determined to keep fighting, even against ex-revolutionaries who now want to come over to the pro-natalist side. The main distinction is that the pro-natalists want to use technology to make all children healthier.

Indeed, thanks to new technology, in spite of the social conservatives, new babies are busting out all over. The first offspring of the New Year in the Washington DC area was born to a lesbian couple, Helen Rubin and Joanna Bare; Rubin conceived through artificial insemination. Is this bad? The Washington Post didn't think so; it ran a sympathetic story on its front page. Yeah sure, some might say, that's the liberal Post, at it again. But interestingly, the conservative-tilting Washington Times carried the story on its front page, too, under the friendly headline, "Lesbian couple welcome daughter." The Times article approvingly quoted proud grandfather Howard Rubin saying, "This child is going to have a traditional family... traditional grandparents on both sides, traditional aunts and uncles." Is this so bad?

If pro-lifers and cultural conservatives denounce gay parenthood, as many of them do, then that will be just one more stick of evidence piling up to prove that pro-lifers aren't so pro-life as "pro-tradition." That is, if they pick and choose the reproductive techniques according to their own standard-in which certain kinds of parenting are deemed acceptable, other kinds not acceptable-then they will further demonstrate that their movement is a particularistic and reactionary critique of modernity, and not representative of an overall seamless commitment to "life." Indeed, some day the pro- lifers might be more usefully lumped in with others who oppose technological innovation, such as those who support anesthesia-free "natural childbirth." In fact, today's pro-lifers might find themselves better called "pro-natural," and find their ultimate alliance in league with the Amish, organic farmers, and many environmentalists.

But in the meantime, as the happy story of Helen Rubin and Joanna Bare attests, more Americans on the right, as well as the left, are coming to accept the reality that new ways of bringing children into the world are upon us. Which in turn might explain why experts see no sure outcome for anti-cloning efforts in the 108th Congress. The front-page headline in the December 26 Washington Post summed up the standoff: "An Uncertain Year for Cloning Laws: Ban on Embryo Research Seen as Unlikely."

Yes, the American people are worried about cloning. But maybe not so worried that they want the politicians to block the next evolution in medical science, an evolution that has made lives richer and better-and maybe, soon, more abundant.

Originally from: www.techcentralstation.com/1051/techwrapper.jsp?PID=1051-250&CID=1051-011503C