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Religion is a product of evolution,
software suggests
God may work in mysterious ways, but a simple computer
program may explain how religion evolved
27 May 2008
NewScientist.com
By distilling religious belief into a genetic predisposition to pass along
unverifiable information, the program predicts that religion will flourish.
However, religion only takes hold if non-believers help believers out
perhaps because they are impressed by their devotion.
"If a person is willing to sacrifice for an abstract god then people feel
like they are willing to sacrifice for the community," says James Dow, an
evolutionary anthropologist at Oakland University in Rochester, Michigan,
US, who wrote the program called Evogod (download the code
here).
Dow is by no means the first scientist to take a stab at explaining how
religion emerged. Theories on the evolution of religion tend toward two
camps. One argues that religion is a mental artefact, co-opted from brain
functions that evolved for other tasks.
Aiding the people
Another contends that religion benefited our ancestors. Rather than being a
by-product of other brain functions, it is an adaptation in its own right.
In this explanation, natural selection slowly purged human populations of
the non-religious.
"Sometime between 100,000 years ago to the point where writing was invented,
maybe about 7000 BC, we begin to have records of people's supernatural
beliefs," Dow says.
To determine if it was possible for religion to emerge as an adaptation, Dow
wrote a simple computer program that focuses on the evolutionary benefits
people receive from their interactions with one another.
"What people are adapting to is other people," he says.
Religious attraction
To simplify matters, Dow picked a defining trait of religion: the desire to
proclaim religious information to others, such as a belief in the afterlife.
He assumed that this trait was genetic.
The model assumes, in other words, that a small number of people have a
genetic predisposition to communicate unverifiable information to others.
They passed on that trait to their children, but they also interacted with
people who didn't spread unreal information.
The model looks at the reproductive success of the two sorts of people
those who pass on real information, and those who pass on unreal
information.
Under most scenarios, "believers in the unreal" went extinct. But when Dow
included the assumption that non-believers would be attracted to religious
people because of some clear, but arbitrary, signal, religion flourished.
"Somehow the communicators of unreal information are attracting others to
communicate real information to them," Dow says, speculating that perhaps
the non-believers are touched by the faith of the religious.
Ancient needs
Richard Sosis, an evolutionary anthropologist at the University of
Connecticut in Storrs, US, says the model adds a new dimension to the debate
over how religion could have evolved, which has previously relied on verbal
arguments and speculation. But "these are baby steps", he cautions.
Sosis previously found that in some populations kibbutzim in Israel, for
instance more religious people receive more assistance from others than
the less faithful. But he notes that the forces that maintain religion in
modern humans could be very different from those that promoted its
emergence, thousands of years ago.
Palaeolithic humans were probably far more reliant than modern humans on the
community they were born into, Sosis says. "[Now] you can be a Lutheran one
week and decide the following week you are going to become a Buddhist."
Journal reference: Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Stimulation,
vol 11, p 2
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New study on the comfort of imaginary
friends
National Secular Society
18 January 2008
In terms of companionship, God may function like a Yorkie
with a hairbow. This is the conclusion of a new study which finds that both
God and anthropomorphised pets can represent attempts to populate one's
environment with pseudo-people, and that the impulse to do this appears to
be reinforced by loneliness. The paper, to be published in next month's
Psychological Science, concludes that "social disconnection increases the
tendency to create humanlike agents...."
This makes good evolutionary sense. Even moderate isolation from other
people can compromise one's immune system, while also elevating blood
pressure, stress hormones and even the incidence of clinical depression.
Taken together, the effects of loneliness turn out to be as damaging to the
health as smoking cigarettes. Thus anything that decreases the feeling of
isolation is going to be a survival benefit, regardless of whether the
"friend" is non-human or even non-existent.
In experiments where people are subjected to extreme isolation, they quickly
begin holding conversations with imaginary people, animals or deities.
Recent surveys suggest that people feel more connected to God when praying
alone than in a group. And the lonely are more likely than others to report
having a personal relationship with God. The death of a loved one also tends
to increase religious beliefs.
In the new study, these results from previous ones were checked
experimentally by artificially inducing a sense of social isolation in both
believers and non-believers. As expected, this resulted in increased
expressions of belief in the religious and even, to a lesser extent, in the
doubters. As the psychologists noted, Social disconnection does not turn
atheists into fundamentalists, of course, but it may nudge religious belief
for believers and non-believers alike.
Many studies have shown that both believers and pet owners tend to be
happier and healthier, but until now no one had pointed out a connection:
the comfort of imaginary friends.
Source: N. Epley et al., "Creating Social Connection Through Inferential
Reproduction", Psychological Science, February 2008.
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The higher the price, the more we like it
Researchers use wine tasting to show how marketing tactics
can trick the brain to find more enjoyment in costlier products.
Los Angeles Times
January 15, 2008
When it comes to wine tasting, pleasure is in the price.
Using brain scanners to monitor the minds of wine drinkers, scientists found
that people given two identical red wines got more pleasure from tasting the
one they were told cost more.
The study, reported Monday in Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, demonstrated for the first time how marketing tactics -- such as
raising the price of a product -- can cause the brain to play tricks on
itself.
Researchers led by Antonio Rangel, associate professor of economics at
Caltech, asked 20 volunteers to rank their enjoyment of small sips of five
differently priced Cabernet Sauvignon wines while a functional MRI machine
monitored the brain response. Volunteers also were asked to rate the flavor
intensity of the wines.
Unbeknown to volunteers, two sets of wine samples were identical: the $5 and
$45 wines ($5 actual price) and the $10 and $90 wines ($90 actual price).
The fifth wine was identified by its actual $35 price.
Volunteers were asked to rank the pleasantness of the wines. They liked the
$90 wine best and the $5 wine least.
Brain scans showed that activity in the part of the brain that detects
pleasure also moved in lock step with price. The medial orbital prefrontal
cortex, which is located behind the eyes, showed the greatest activity when
volunteers drank the wine marked $90 and the least activity when they sipped
the wine priced at $5.
Prices had no effect on flavor intensity ratings. Volunteers said the $5 and
$45 wines and the $10 and $90 wines were identically sweet.
Rangel said the findings showed that pleasantness of consuming a product
relied not only on the product's intrinsic properties, such as flavor in the
case of wine, but also on certain beliefs, such as the notion that expensive
wines will probably taste better, he said. By manipulating prices "we can
change how wine tastes without changing the wine," Rangel said. "It's
mind-blowing."
Two weeks after the experiment, volunteers were asked to rate the wines in
the absence of price data. They liked the wines originally marked $5 and $45
best and the samples labeled $10 and $90 second best.
George Loewenstein, professor of economics and psychology at Carnegie Mellon
University in Pittsburgh, who was not involved in the study, said the
findings supported research on consumer behavior.
"People pay high prices for water from Italy, and we know that water tastes
about the same wherever it comes from," he said. "Price is one of the many
attributes that people pay attention to, and it affects how we perceive
things as a consumer."
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God the Father
a book review by Kenneth W. Krause
July 2005
Surely infantilism is destined to be surmounted, wrote
Sigmund Freud in his 1927 The Future of an Illusion. Men cannot remain
children for ever; they must in the end go out into the hostile life. We
may call this education to reality. Freud, of course, was referring to
the infantilism of religion or as he so bluntly labeled it, the
universal obsessional neurosis of humanity.
In The Psychological Roots of Religious Belief, M.D. Faber (Professor
Emeritus of English Language and Literature specializing in literature and
psychology at the University of Victoria, British Columbia, and former
Special Fellow at the National Institute of Mental Health in Washington
D.C.) takes issue with Freuds ultimate conclusion. In the religious
context, men and women apparently can and often do remain children
forever, thanks in large measure to Abrahamic monotheisms reliance on the
omnipotent Parent-God.
Faber affirms that we are born fundamentally free from religious
predilections, liberated to pursue a reasoned, constructive, and cooperative
existence. How is it, then, that throngs of us slump into the swift stream
of monotheistic superstition at every widening bend to be whisked away,
perhaps forever, like so much like loose sand, despite our natural tendency
toward firmly-grounded, rational thought? What is it about the human
experience following the moment of birth that renders us so vulnerable to
the Parent-Gods charms?
According to D. Andrew Kille, former pastor and lecturer in psychology and
spirituality, and the author of The Bible Made Me Do It (in The
Destructive Power of Religion, ed. J. Harold Ellens, Praeger Publishing,
2004), Psychologists of religion have long recognized the close connection
between early childhood development and later religious images and behavior.
In the earliest experiences of mother and care lie the roots of God images
and emotionally charged attitudes and reactions to spirituality and
religious thinking. Such is the general theme of Fabers book, a theme he
argues quite convincingly and in copious detail.
According to Faber, the caregiving parent begins laying the groundwork for
the childs eventual religiosity shortly after birth during what Faber calls
the basic biological situation. Over and over, literally thousands of
times per year, the needful infant cries out for and immediately receives
nourishment, warmth, comfort, and care from the apparently omnipotent
parent, usually the mother. The infants crying, or supplication, in
response to crises constitutes proto-prayer. The omni-benevolent and
all-powerful mother, in turn, becomes the childs proto-deity.
According to Faber, The basic biological situation gives rise at the
implicit, unconscious level to the perceptual, emotional scheme from which
emanates our deepest emotional longings and perceptual inclinations. The
pattern of supplication and provision becomes internalized, literally rooted
into the neural fabric of the childs brain. Like muscles, synaptic
connections grow stronger after repeated use. The pattern becomes
permanently imprinted into unconscious memory. Faber identifies this process
as mnemonic priming for eventual mapping onto the religious narrative
and projection onto the illusionary Parent-God.
In most cases, neither the child nor the parent will ever comprehend what
has occurred. The process is an entirely implicit one, relegated to the
realm of what Freud dubbed infantile amnesia. Later in life, in response
to external religious stimuli, for example, these implicit memories of the
basic biological situation will be cued, played, and repeated as efficiently
as can be: The religious realm into which the child gradually enters
mirrors unconsciously, associatively, perceptually, and affectively the
presubjective reality that the child has been internalizing and installing
neurally as the basis of his gradually emerging identity. The religious
realm, in two words, corresponds implicitly to the childs mind.
During the earliest stages of development, the child conceives of no
existence apart from its parent. It finds an image of itself only in the
caretaker, and thus, it participates in the world only through the
caretaker. The child, writes Faber, cannot at this stage say to the
parent, You misunderstand me, because no me exists apart from the
parents understanding. Thus the reality of the caregiver does not become
a reality for the child; it becomes the only reality, the only place
in which he has existence. As such, the child attributes the provision of
care and security not to the mother alone, but to itself as well. It is the
childs heady estimation of its own omnipotence, then, that marks the
symbiotic phase, which peaks in intensity at about six to nine months.
Thereafter, as the child embarks on the process of separation from the
caregiver, it will begin to implicitly suffer the terrifying loss of worldly
hegemony. This movement away, writes Faber, is attended by powerful
anxiety and by the irrational wish to have it both ways: separateness and
symbiotic union.
During what some psychologists identify as the practicing phase, eleven to
fifteen months, the infant becomes more engaged in its burgeoning mental and
physical world. Even so, it always returns to the mother for emotional
refueling. At about thirty months, during the rapprochement phase, the
separation process culminates; the child begins to fully comprehend the
solitary nature of its existence. The toddler will first demand attention
from its parental caregiver and then turn to other persons, including the
father, and to transitional objects, including toys, pets, blankets, etc.,
in an attempt to maintain emotional constancy.
Some have characterized the childs separation from the parental caregiver
as a life-long mourning process that triggers an endless search for
replacement. According to Faber:
[T]he passing of the rapprochement crisis simply means that one is now in a
position to act out among others this basic human dilemma It means that one
can now seek for omnipotence, fusion, and narcissistic gratification in the
wider world We have in this remarkable situation the living seed of the
faith-state, of the believers hallucinatory, heartfelt conviction that
his invisible, mysterious, transmundane Parent-God is there. Not only does
the will to believe, to accept the veracity of religious narrative, push
upward ineluctably toward consciousness from an inward source one
affectively recognizes yet cannot directly detect, but the narratives
wishful, alluring core holds the promise of attachment to a loving provider,
to a Spirit through Whom one may lessen the pain of precisely the separation
just described For most human beings the combination is irresistible, and
its effects persist with varying degrees of intensity throughout the course
of the life cycle.
The childs desire to have it both ways to separate, yet preserve
emotional union or dependency on a caregiver is what eventually results in
the central motivational goal of the religionists spiritual commitment.
By the time religious narratives exert themselves, the child has already
been primed and prepared for initiation into the divine, supernatural
realm.
Implicit memories of these symbiotic and post-symbiotic states, then, are
abundant and immediately accessible for stimulation by monotheistic
narratives. Young children are encouraged, if not threatened and bullied, to
conform their beliefs to such narratives before their rational faculties
have ripened, before they can critically evaluate their churches claims,
before they can possibly fathom the overwhelming power of their unconscious
minds.
Religion, in this theory, is anything but a passive recipient of immature
minds. According to the author:
[Churches] strive to trigger state-dependent memories of the early period
through formal, diurnal practices [Religion] has shrewdly played into mans
most childlike needs, not only by offering eternal guarantees for an
omniscient powers benevolence (if properly appeased) but by magic words and
significant gestures, soothing sounds and soporific smells an infants
world Thus religion is a cunning, unconscious method of preserving the tie
to the original mother and father We can play the game of life in two
directions, staying put and moving on And so it is with religion Not only
does one get the caregiver back, but one gets the caregiver back in an
idealized form. One is not alone, and one has nothing to fear from a just
and merciful God.
The basic biological situation, the implicit memories, the desperate anxiety
associated with separation, and every churchs deliberate and clever attempt
to seduce innocent minds such factors travel a great distance in
explaining monotheisms virtually irresistible attraction for humanity,
including the most intelligent and educated among us.
Faber wisely stops short, however, of claiming that religiosity is inherent
to the human condition:
The widespread notion that we are wired for God or genetically endowed
with a need for faith emerges from our psychodynamic context as a
misperception of human behavior an understandable, wishful, natural
misperception to be sure, but inaccurate nonetheless. Are the many millions
of people throughout the world who do not believe in God the products of
faulty wiring? Has their elemental, primal nature been somehow distorted or
suppressed? I dont think so.
Indeed, if any reasonable person were to compare the relative difficulties
of two hypothetical tasks first, remaining utterly non-religious for one
day, and second, remaining completely non-rational for but one minute such
a person would surely conclude that humanity is naturally rational and not
naturally religious. No conscious and able-minded person, after all, could
possibly elude the process of collecting evidence, weighing it, and drawing
conclusions based on that evidence even if the only conclusion she
ultimately draws is that she remains safe where she is.
Freethinking adults have found the religious program irrelevant or
unengaging, argues Faber, largely because, by the time of religious
exposure, that program has already been replaced by other neural,
perceptual connections, by other narratives, by other theoretical outlooks
and conclusions. A rigorous and liberal education is critical, it would
appear, if parents wish for their children the rewards of a rational life.
Nevertheless, people of reason have abundant cause to be hopeful. The
situation is not irremediable. Because all humans are inherently rational
and freedom loving, they possess every tool required in the effort to resist
the mapping process. If and when they do, according to Faber, both flock
and earthly shepherds are apt to disappear. Faber affirms our ultimate
hopes without reservation: Because religion must confront the realm of
reason through its truth claims, it, religion, is not merely vulnerable but
mortal: it can die.
Yet, regrettably, Faber is unable to resist at least one of his own
irrational vices. Without conveying a legitimate basis for doing so, Faber
shamelessly panders to desperate monotheists by offering them a rusty hook
upon which to hang their tattered hat: The entire psychological pattern I
am working to depict here may have been conceived and initiated by a
supernatural Almighty and Ultimate First Cause.
Is this Fabers way of implying that anything is possible? What would be the
point of such a meaningless gesture? The issue, after all, is not the
existence of some abstract and undefined entity that we might characterize
as a god if we were ever to encounter it. The real issue concerns the
idiosyncratic gods of Abrahamic monotheism, which, according to logic and a
clear preponderance of all available evidence, simply does not exist. Rather
than compromising himself for the approval of a substantial but unreasoned
audience, Faber should have remained true to his principal scientific
arguments.
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