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It's
in your Psychology |
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You
either choose to believe god exists, or you choose to believe he doesn't.
It's as simple as that. |
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Survivor still haunted by 1971 air crash
Juliane Koepcke is not someone you'd expect to attract
attention. Plainly dressed and wearing prescription glasses, Koepcke sits
behind her desk at the Zoological Center in Munich, Germany, where she's a
librarian.
By Frederik Pleitgen
CNN
2 July 2009
Yet this unassuming middle aged woman has one of the most exciting and
unbelievable stories of tragedy and survival to tell.
It was Christmas Eve, 1971, when Koepcke, then aged 17, and her mother
boarded a Lockheed Electra turboprop for a flight from Lima, Peru, to
Pucallpa in the Amazonian rainforest. Her parents, both famous zoologists,
ran a research station in the jungle studying wildlife.
The airline, LANSA, had already lost two aircraft in previous crashes. "We
knew the airline had a bad reputation," Koepcke told CNN, "but we
desperately wanted to be with my father for Christmas, so we figured it
would be alright."
The flight was supposed to last for less than an hour and for the first 25
minutes everything was fine, Koepcke recalled.
"Then we flew into heavy clouds and the plane started shaking. My mother was
very nervous. Then to the right we saw a bright flash and the plane went
into a nose dive. My mother said, 'This is it!'"
An accident investigation later found that one of the fuel tanks of the
Lockheed Electra had been hit by a bolt of lightning which had torn the
right wing off.
"We were headed straight down. Christmas presents were flying around the
cabin and I could hear people screaming." Watch Koepcke tell her dramatic
survivor's story »
As the plane broke into pieces in midair, Koepcke was thrust out into the
open air:
"Suddenly there was this amazing silence. The plane was gone. I must have
been unconscious and then came to in midair. I was flying, spinning through
the air and I could see the forest spinning beneath me."
Then Koepcke lost consciousness again. She fell more than three kilometers
(two miles) into the jungle canopy but miraculously survived with only minor
injuries. Ninety-one other people aboard Flight 508 died.
Koepcke says she is not a spiritual person and has
tried to find logical explanations for why she survived.
"Maybe it was the fact that I was still attached to a whole row of seats,"
she says. "It was rotating much like the helicopter and that might have
slowed the fall. Also, the place I landed had very thick foliage and that
might have lessened the impact."
In any case she survived with only minor injuries. Her collarbone was
broken, her right eye swollen shut, she was suffering concussion and had
large gashes on her arms and legs.
"I didn't wake up until nine o'clock the next morning. I know this because
my watch was still working. So I must have been unconscious the whole
afternoon and the night. When I came to I was alone, just me ... and my row
of seats."
Her ordeal was far from over. Rescue planes and search crews were unable to
locate the crash site and Koepcke was stranded in the jungle alone. But she
had spent years on the research station with her parents and her father had
taught her how to survive in the rainforest -- she knew how to cope in that
environment.
""He said if you find a creek, follow it because that will lead to a stream
and a stream will lead to a bigger river and that's where you'll find help."
The day after the crash she found a creek and started to wade down stream,
but it was tough going. The only food she had was some candy she had found
at the crash site and her wounds were quickly infested with parasites.
"I had a cut on my arm and after a few days I could feel there was something
in it. I took a look and a fly had laid her eggs in the hole. It was full of
maggots. I was afraid I would lose my arm. Later, after I was rescued it was
treated and more than 50 maggots were found inside. I still wonder how so
many maggots could have fitted into that little hole, it was no bigger than
a one euro coin."
As she travelled downstream, Koepcke discovered more wreckage from the plane
-- and found some of the crash victims.
"I found another row of seats with three dead women still strapped in. They
had landed head-first and the impact must have been so hard that they were
buried almost two feet into the ground.
"I was horrified -- I didn't want to touch them but I wanted to make sure
that my mother wasn't one of them. So I took a stick and knocked a shoe off
one of the bodies. The toe nails had nail polish on them and I knew it could
not have been my mother because she never used nail polish."
Juliane continued through the rainforest, wading through jungle streams
infested with crocodiles, piranhas and devil rays.
"Sometimes I would see a crocodile on the bank and it would start into the
water towards me, but I was not afraid. I knew crocodiles don't tend to
attack humans."
After 10 days, starved and exhausted, Koepke finally came upon a small boat
and a hut on the river. She stayed there, hoping to be rescued. The next day
a group of Peruvian lumberjacks found her and brought her to the next town.
She became known as the miracle girl and was hounded by Peruvian media,
receiving hundreds of letters from people she had never met before.
"It was so strange," she says, smiling. "Some of the letters were simply
addressed 'Juliane -- Peru' but they still all found their way to me."
The events of 1971 still haunt Koepcke and she says the memories are
especially clear when she is confronted with airline disasters like last
month's Air France crash off the coast of Brazil.
"It just horrifies me. I only hope it all went quickly for those on board."
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People sometimes seek the truth, but most
prefer like-minded views
University of Illinois psychology professor Dolores
Albarracin and her colleagues found that people who are unsure of their own
beliefs are less likely to entertain opposing views. Credit: Photo by L.
Brian Stauffer, U. of I. News Bureau.
July 1st, 2009 in Medicine & Health / Psychology & Psychiatry
We swim in a sea of information, but filter out most of what we see and
hear. A new analysis of data from dozens of studies sheds new light on how
we choose what we do and do not hear. The study found that while people tend
to avoid information that contradicts what they already think or believe,
certain factors can cause them to seek out, or at least consider, other
points of view.
The analysis, reported this month in Psychological Bulletin, published by
the American Psychological Association, was led by researchers at the
University of Illinois and the University of Florida, and included data from
91 studies involving nearly 8,000 participants. It puts to rest a
longstanding debate over whether people actively avoid information that
contradicts what they believe, or whether they are simply exposed more often
to ideas that conform to their own because they tend to be surrounded by
like-minded people.
"We wanted to see exactly across the board to what extent people are willing
to seek out the truth versus just stay comfortable with what they know,"
said University of Illinois psychology professor Dolores Albarracín, who led
the study with University of Florida researcher William Hart. The team also
included researchers from Northwestern University and Ohio University.
The studies they reviewed generally asked participants about their views on
a given topic and then allowed them to choose whether they wanted to view or
read information supporting their own or an opposing point of view.
The researchers found that people are about twice as likely to select
information that supports their own point of view (67 percent) as to
consider an opposing idea (33 percent).
Certain individuals, those with close-minded personalities, are even more
reluctant to expose themselves to differing perspectives, Albarracín said.
They will opt for the information that corresponds to their views nearly 75
percent of the time.
The researchers also found, not surprisingly, that people are more resistant
to new points of view when their own ideas are associated with political,
religious or ethical values.
"If you are really committed to your own attitude - for example, if you are
a very committed Democrat - you are more likely to seek congenial
information, that is, information that corresponds with your views,"
Albarracín said. "If the issues concern moral values or politics, about 70
percent of the time you will choose congenial information, versus about 60
percent of the time if the issues are not related to values."
Perhaps more surprisingly, people who have little confidence in their own
beliefs are less likely to expose themselves to contrary views than people
who are very confident in their own ideas, Albarracín said.
Certain factors can also induce people to seek out opposing points of view,
she said. Those who may have to publicly defend their ideas, such as
politicians, for example, are more motivated to learn about the views of
those who oppose them. In the process, she said, they sometimes find that
their own ideas evolve.
People are also more likely to expose themselves to opposing ideas when it
is useful to them in some way, Albarracín said.
"If you're going to buy a house and you really like the house, you're still
going to have it inspected," she said. Similarly, no matter how much you
like your surgeon, you may seek out a second opinion before scheduling a
major operation, she said.
"For the most part it seems that people tend to stay with their own beliefs
and attitudes because changing those might prevent them from living the
lives they're living," Albarracín said. "But it's good news that one out of
three times, or close to that, they are willing to seek out the other side."
More information: "Feeling Validated Versus Being Correct: A Meta-Analysis
of Selective Exposure to Information" appears in volume 135, No. 4 of
Psychological Bulletin. The co-authors: Albarracin; Hart, Inge Brechan and
Lisa Merrill, of the University of Florida; Alice H. Eagly, of Northwestern
University; and Matthew J. Lindberg, of Ohio University.
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Religion is a product of evolution,
software suggests
God may work in mysterious ways, but a simple computer
program may explain how religion evolved
27 May 2008
NewScientist.com
By distilling religious belief into a genetic predisposition to pass along
unverifiable information, the program predicts that religion will flourish.
However, religion only takes hold if non-believers help believers out –
perhaps because they are impressed by their devotion.
"If a person is willing to sacrifice for an abstract god then people feel
like they are willing to sacrifice for the community," says James Dow, an
evolutionary anthropologist at Oakland University in Rochester, Michigan,
US, who wrote the program – called Evogod (download the code
here).
Dow is by no means the first scientist to take a stab at explaining how
religion emerged. Theories on the evolution of religion tend toward two
camps. One argues that religion is a mental artefact, co-opted from brain
functions that evolved for other tasks.
Aiding the people
Another contends that religion benefited our ancestors. Rather than being a
by-product of other brain functions, it is an adaptation in its own right.
In this explanation, natural selection slowly purged human populations of
the non-religious.
"Sometime between 100,000 years ago to the point where writing was invented,
maybe about 7000 BC, we begin to have records of people's supernatural
beliefs," Dow says.
To determine if it was possible for religion to emerge as an adaptation, Dow
wrote a simple computer program that focuses on the evolutionary benefits
people receive from their interactions with one another.
"What people are adapting to is other people," he says.
Religious attraction
To simplify matters, Dow picked a defining trait of religion: the desire to
proclaim religious information to others, such as a belief in the afterlife.
He assumed that this trait was genetic.
The model assumes, in other words, that a small number of people have a
genetic predisposition to communicate unverifiable information to others.
They passed on that trait to their children, but they also interacted with
people who didn't spread unreal information.
The model looks at the reproductive success of the two sorts of people –
those who pass on real information, and those who pass on unreal
information.
Under most scenarios, "believers in the unreal" went extinct. But when Dow
included the assumption that non-believers would be attracted to religious
people because of some clear, but arbitrary, signal, religion flourished.
"Somehow the communicators of unreal information are attracting others to
communicate real information to them," Dow says, speculating that perhaps
the non-believers are touched by the faith of the religious.
Ancient needs
Richard Sosis, an evolutionary anthropologist at the University of
Connecticut in Storrs, US, says the model adds a new dimension to the debate
over how religion could have evolved, which has previously relied on verbal
arguments and speculation. But "these are baby steps", he cautions.
Sosis previously found that in some populations – kibbutzim in Israel, for
instance – more religious people receive more assistance from others than
the less faithful. But he notes that the forces that maintain religion in
modern humans could be very different from those that promoted its
emergence, thousands of years ago.
Palaeolithic humans were probably far more reliant than modern humans on the
community they were born into, Sosis says. "[Now] you can be a Lutheran one
week and decide the following week you are going to become a Buddhist."
Journal reference: Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Stimulation,
vol 11, p 2
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New study on the comfort of imaginary
friends
National Secular Society
18 January 2008
In terms of companionship, God may function like a Yorkie
with a hairbow. This is the conclusion of a new study which finds that both
God and anthropomorphised pets can represent attempts to populate one's
environment with pseudo-people, and that the impulse to do this appears to
be reinforced by loneliness. The paper, to be published in next month's
Psychological Science, concludes that "social disconnection increases the
tendency to create humanlike agents...."
This makes good evolutionary sense. Even moderate isolation from other
people can compromise one's immune system, while also elevating blood
pressure, stress hormones and even the incidence of clinical depression.
Taken together, the effects of loneliness turn out to be as damaging to the
health as smoking cigarettes. Thus anything that decreases the feeling of
isolation is going to be a survival benefit, regardless of whether the
"friend" is non-human or even non-existent.
In experiments where people are subjected to extreme isolation, they quickly
begin holding conversations with imaginary people, animals or deities.
Recent surveys suggest that people feel more connected to God when praying
alone than in a group. And the lonely are more likely than others to report
having a personal relationship with God. The death of a loved one also tends
to increase religious beliefs.
In the new study, these results from previous ones were checked
experimentally by artificially inducing a sense of social isolation in both
believers and non-believers. As expected, this resulted in increased
expressions of belief in the religious and even, to a lesser extent, in the
doubters. As the psychologists noted, “Social disconnection does not turn
atheists into fundamentalists, of course, but it may nudge religious belief
for believers and non-believers alike.”
Many studies have shown that both believers and pet owners tend to be
happier and healthier, but until now no one had pointed out a connection:
the comfort of imaginary friends.
Source: N. Epley et al., "Creating Social Connection Through Inferential
Reproduction", Psychological Science, February 2008.
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The higher the price, the more we like it
Researchers use wine tasting to show how marketing tactics
can trick the brain to find more enjoyment in costlier products.
Los Angeles Times
January 15, 2008
When it comes to wine tasting, pleasure is in the price.
Using brain scanners to monitor the minds of wine drinkers, scientists found
that people given two identical red wines got more pleasure from tasting the
one they were told cost more.
The study, reported Monday in Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, demonstrated for the first time how marketing tactics -- such as
raising the price of a product -- can cause the brain to play tricks on
itself.
Researchers led by Antonio Rangel, associate professor of economics at
Caltech, asked 20 volunteers to rank their enjoyment of small sips of five
differently priced Cabernet Sauvignon wines while a functional MRI machine
monitored the brain response. Volunteers also were asked to rate the flavor
intensity of the wines.
Unbeknown to volunteers, two sets of wine samples were identical: the $5 and
$45 wines ($5 actual price) and the $10 and $90 wines ($90 actual price).
The fifth wine was identified by its actual $35 price.
Volunteers were asked to rank the pleasantness of the wines. They liked the
$90 wine best and the $5 wine least.
Brain scans showed that activity in the part of the brain that detects
pleasure also moved in lock step with price. The medial orbital prefrontal
cortex, which is located behind the eyes, showed the greatest activity when
volunteers drank the wine marked $90 and the least activity when they sipped
the wine priced at $5.
Prices had no effect on flavor intensity ratings. Volunteers said the $5 and
$45 wines and the $10 and $90 wines were identically sweet.
Rangel said the findings showed that pleasantness of consuming a product
relied not only on the product's intrinsic properties, such as flavor in the
case of wine, but also on certain beliefs, such as the notion that expensive
wines will probably taste better, he said. By manipulating prices "we can
change how wine tastes without changing the wine," Rangel said. "It's
mind-blowing."
Two weeks after the experiment, volunteers were asked to rate the wines in
the absence of price data. They liked the wines originally marked $5 and $45
best and the samples labeled $10 and $90 second best.
George Loewenstein, professor of economics and psychology at Carnegie Mellon
University in Pittsburgh, who was not involved in the study, said the
findings supported research on consumer behavior.
"People pay high prices for water from Italy, and we know that water tastes
about the same wherever it comes from," he said. "Price is one of the many
attributes that people pay attention to, and it affects how we perceive
things as a consumer."
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God the Father
a book review by Kenneth W. Krause
July 2005
Surely infantilism is destined to be surmounted, wrote
Sigmund Freud in his 1927 The Future of an Illusion. Men cannot remain
children for ever; they must in the end go out into the hostile life. We
may call this education to reality. Freud, of course, was referring to
the infantilism of religion or as he so bluntly labeled it, the
universal obsessional neurosis of humanity.
In The Psychological Roots of Religious Belief, M.D. Faber (Professor
Emeritus of English Language and Literature specializing in literature and
psychology at the University of Victoria, British Columbia, and former
Special Fellow at the National Institute of Mental Health in Washington
D.C.) takes issue with Freuds ultimate conclusion. In the religious
context, men and women apparently can and often do remain children
forever, thanks in large measure to Abrahamic monotheisms reliance on the
omnipotent Parent-God.
Faber affirms that we are born fundamentally free from religious
predilections, liberated to pursue a reasoned, constructive, and cooperative
existence. How is it, then, that throngs of us slump into the swift stream
of monotheistic superstition at every widening bend to be whisked away,
perhaps forever, like so much like loose sand, despite our natural tendency
toward firmly-grounded, rational thought? What is it about the human
experience following the moment of birth that renders us so vulnerable to
the Parent-Gods charms?
According to D. Andrew Kille, former pastor and lecturer in psychology and
spirituality, and the author of The Bible Made Me Do It (in The
Destructive Power of Religion, ed. J. Harold Ellens, Praeger Publishing,
2004), Psychologists of religion have long recognized the close connection
between early childhood development and later religious images and behavior.
In the earliest experiences of mother and care lie the roots of God images
and emotionally charged attitudes and reactions to spirituality and
religious thinking. Such is the general theme of Fabers book, a theme he
argues quite convincingly and in copious detail.
According to Faber, the caregiving parent begins laying the groundwork for
the childs eventual religiosity shortly after birth during what Faber calls
the basic biological situation. Over and over, literally thousands of
times per year, the needful infant cries out for and immediately receives
nourishment, warmth, comfort, and care from the apparently omnipotent
parent, usually the mother. The infants crying, or supplication, in
response to crises constitutes proto-prayer. The omni-benevolent and
all-powerful mother, in turn, becomes the childs proto-deity.
According to Faber, The basic biological situation gives rise at the
implicit, unconscious level to the perceptual, emotional scheme from which
emanates our deepest emotional longings and perceptual inclinations. The
pattern of supplication and provision becomes internalized, literally rooted
into the neural fabric of the childs brain. Like muscles, synaptic
connections grow stronger after repeated use. The pattern becomes
permanently imprinted into unconscious memory. Faber identifies this process
as mnemonic priming for eventual mapping onto the religious narrative
and projection onto the illusionary Parent-God.
In most cases, neither the child nor the parent will ever comprehend what
has occurred. The process is an entirely implicit one, relegated to the
realm of what Freud dubbed infantile amnesia. Later in life, in response
to external religious stimuli, for example, these implicit memories of the
basic biological situation will be cued, played, and repeated as efficiently
as can be: The religious realm into which the child gradually enters
mirrors unconsciously, associatively, perceptually, and affectively the
presubjective reality that the child has been internalizing and installing
neurally as the basis of his gradually emerging identity. The religious
realm, in two words, corresponds implicitly to the childs mind.
During the earliest stages of development, the child conceives of no
existence apart from its parent. It finds an image of itself only in the
caretaker, and thus, it participates in the world only through the
caretaker. The child, writes Faber, cannot at this stage say to the
parent, You misunderstand me, because no me exists apart from the
parents understanding. Thus the reality of the caregiver does not become
a reality for the child; it becomes the only reality, the only place
in which he has existence. As such, the child attributes the provision of
care and security not to the mother alone, but to itself as well. It is the
childs heady estimation of its own omnipotence, then, that marks the
symbiotic phase, which peaks in intensity at about six to nine months.
Thereafter, as the child embarks on the process of separation from the
caregiver, it will begin to implicitly suffer the terrifying loss of worldly
hegemony. This movement away, writes Faber, is attended by powerful
anxiety and by the irrational wish to have it both ways: separateness and
symbiotic union.
During what some psychologists identify as the practicing phase, eleven to
fifteen months, the infant becomes more engaged in its burgeoning mental and
physical world. Even so, it always returns to the mother for emotional
refueling. At about thirty months, during the rapprochement phase, the
separation process culminates; the child begins to fully comprehend the
solitary nature of its existence. The toddler will first demand attention
from its parental caregiver and then turn to other persons, including the
father, and to transitional objects, including toys, pets, blankets, etc.,
in an attempt to maintain emotional constancy.
Some have characterized the childs separation from the parental caregiver
as a life-long mourning process that triggers an endless search for
replacement. According to Faber:
[T]he passing of the rapprochement crisis simply means that one is now in a
position to act out among others this basic human dilemma It means that one
can now seek for omnipotence, fusion, and narcissistic gratification in the
wider world We have in this remarkable situation the living seed of the
faith-state, of the believers hallucinatory, heartfelt conviction that
his invisible, mysterious, transmundane Parent-God is there. Not only does
the will to believe, to accept the veracity of religious narrative, push
upward ineluctably toward consciousness from an inward source one
affectively recognizes yet cannot directly detect, but the narratives
wishful, alluring core holds the promise of attachment to a loving provider,
to a Spirit through Whom one may lessen the pain of precisely the separation
just described For most human beings the combination is irresistible, and
its effects persist with varying degrees of intensity throughout the course
of the life cycle.
The childs desire to have it both ways to separate, yet preserve
emotional union or dependency on a caregiver is what eventually results in
the central motivational goal of the religionists spiritual commitment.
By the time religious narratives exert themselves, the child has already
been primed and prepared for initiation into the divine, supernatural
realm.
Implicit memories of these symbiotic and post-symbiotic states, then, are
abundant and immediately accessible for stimulation by monotheistic
narratives. Young children are encouraged, if not threatened and bullied, to
conform their beliefs to such narratives before their rational faculties
have ripened, before they can critically evaluate their churches claims,
before they can possibly fathom the overwhelming power of their unconscious
minds.
Religion, in this theory, is anything but a passive recipient of immature
minds. According to the author:
[Churches] strive to trigger state-dependent memories of the early period
through formal, diurnal practices [Religion] has shrewdly played into mans
most childlike needs, not only by offering eternal guarantees for an
omniscient powers benevolence (if properly appeased) but by magic words and
significant gestures, soothing sounds and soporific smells an infants
world Thus religion is a cunning, unconscious method of preserving the tie
to the original mother and father We can play the game of life in two
directions, staying put and moving on And so it is with religion Not only
does one get the caregiver back, but one gets the caregiver back in an
idealized form. One is not alone, and one has nothing to fear from a just
and merciful God.
The basic biological situation, the implicit memories, the desperate anxiety
associated with separation, and every churchs deliberate and clever attempt
to seduce innocent minds such factors travel a great distance in
explaining monotheisms virtually irresistible attraction for humanity,
including the most intelligent and educated among us.
Faber wisely stops short, however, of claiming that religiosity is inherent
to the human condition:
The widespread notion that we are wired for God or genetically endowed
with a need for faith emerges from our psychodynamic context as a
misperception of human behavior an understandable, wishful, natural
misperception to be sure, but inaccurate nonetheless. Are the many millions
of people throughout the world who do not believe in God the products of
faulty wiring? Has their elemental, primal nature been somehow distorted or
suppressed? I dont think so.
Indeed, if any reasonable person were to compare the relative difficulties
of two hypothetical tasks first, remaining utterly non-religious for one
day, and second, remaining completely non-rational for but one minute such
a person would surely conclude that humanity is naturally rational and not
naturally religious. No conscious and able-minded person, after all, could
possibly elude the process of collecting evidence, weighing it, and drawing
conclusions based on that evidence even if the only conclusion she
ultimately draws is that she remains safe where she is.
Freethinking adults have found the religious program irrelevant or
unengaging, argues Faber, largely because, by the time of religious
exposure, that program has already been replaced by other neural,
perceptual connections, by other narratives, by other theoretical outlooks
and conclusions. A rigorous and liberal education is critical, it would
appear, if parents wish for their children the rewards of a rational life.
Nevertheless, people of reason have abundant cause to be hopeful. The
situation is not irremediable. Because all humans are inherently rational
and freedom loving, they possess every tool required in the effort to resist
the mapping process. If and when they do, according to Faber, both flock
and earthly shepherds are apt to disappear. Faber affirms our ultimate
hopes without reservation: Because religion must confront the realm of
reason through its truth claims, it, religion, is not merely vulnerable but
mortal: it can die.
Yet, regrettably, Faber is unable to resist at least one of his own
irrational vices. Without conveying a legitimate basis for doing so, Faber
shamelessly panders to desperate monotheists by offering them a rusty hook
upon which to hang their tattered hat: The entire psychological pattern I
am working to depict here may have been conceived and initiated by a
supernatural Almighty and Ultimate First Cause.
Is this Fabers way of implying that anything is possible? What would be the
point of such a meaningless gesture? The issue, after all, is not the
existence of some abstract and undefined entity that we might characterize
as a god if we were ever to encounter it. The real issue concerns the
idiosyncratic gods of Abrahamic monotheism, which, according to logic and a
clear preponderance of all available evidence, simply does not exist. Rather
than compromising himself for the approval of a substantial but unreasoned
audience, Faber should have remained true to his principal scientific
arguments.
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