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ON LANGUAGE AND HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
The following points are made by David Premack (Science 2004
303:318):
1) Humans have acquired six symbol systems: two that evolved --
the genetic code and spoken language -- and four that we
invented: written language, arabic
numerals, music notation, and labanotation (a
system for coding choreography). Dobzhansky's quip
"All species are unique, but humans are uniquest" raises the
question: Is it language, the symbol system that evolved only in
humans, that makes humans the "uniquest"? Dobzhansky's quip also
raises a more fundamental question: What exactly is the nature of
human uniqueness?
2) The grammar or syntax of human language is certainly unique.
Like an onion or Russian doll, it is recursive: One instance of
an item is embedded in another instance of
the same item. Recursion makes it possible for the
words in a sentence to be widely separated and yet
dependent on one another. "If-then" is a classic
example. In the sentence "If Jack does not turn up the
thermostat in his house this winter, then Madge and I are not
coming over," "if" and "then" are dependent on each other even
though they are separated by a variable number of words (1-3).
Are animals capable of such recursion? Fitch and Hauser (4) have
reported that tamarin monkeys are not capable of recursion.
Although the monkeys learned a nonrecursive grammar, they failed
to learn a grammar that is recursive. Humans readily learn both.
3) The lack of recursion in tamarins may help to explain why
animals did not evolve recursive language, but it leaves open the
question of why they did not evolve nonrecursive language.
Recursion is not, of course, the only preexisting faculty on
which the evolution of language depends.
4) A laboratory chimpanzee does not call to attract the attention
of its trainer; instead, it pounds on a resonant surface.
Similarly, when chimpanzees become
separated in the compound, they do not call to one
another, as humans would, but search silently
until they see one another and then rush together. If,
as the evidence suggests, vocalization in the chimpanzee is
largely non-voluntary (reflexive), speech could not have evolved.
But then why don't chimpanzees sign to each other? The chimpanzee
has voluntary control of its hands. However, sign language
depends on the face as well as the hands, and facial expression
in the chimpanzee is evidently as reflexive as vocalization.
Facial expressions play linguistic roles in signing, such as
denoting the boundaries of clauses. A signer processes emotional
facial expression in the right hemisphere, but linguistic facial
expression in the left hemisphere (5). This does not mean, of
course, that chimpanzees could not have evolved a language based
on pounding on resonant surfaces, arranging stones on the ground,
and so on. But it does suggest that they could not have evolved
one that is like either speech or sign. (Of course, speech and
sign "travel" with the speaker in a way that stones and resonant
surfaces do not.)
5) What are the factors that distinguish human intelligence? A
major distinctive feature of human intelligence is flexibility.
Animals, by contrast, are specialists. Bees are adept at sending
messages through their dances, beavers at building dams, the
nuthatch at remembering the location of thousands of caches of
acorns it has buried. But each of these species is imprisoned by
its adaptation; none can duplicate the achievement of the other.
The nuthatch cannot build dams; bees do not have an uncanny
memory for hidden caches of food; beavers cannot send messages.
Humans, by contrast, could duplicate all these achievements and
endlessly more. Why? Is recursive language the key to human
flexibility?
6) Human intelligence and evolution are the only flexible
processes on Earth capable of producing endless solutions to the
problems confronted by living creatures. Did evolution, in
producing human intelligence, outstrip itself? Apparently so, for
although evolution can do "engineering", changing actual
structures and producing new devices, it cannot do science,
changing imaginary structures and producing new theories or
explanations of the world. Clearly, language and recursion are
not the sole contributors to human uniqueness.
References (abridged):
1. N. Chomsky, Syntactic Structures (Mouton, The Hague, 1957)
2. S. Pinker, The Language Instinct (Morrow, New York, 1994)
3. M. D. Hauser, N. Chomsky, W. T. Fitch, Science 298, 1569
(2002)
4. W. T. Fitch, M. D. Hauser, Science 303, 377 (2004)
5. E. L. Newport, T. Supulla, in The MIT Encyclopedia of the
Cognitive Sciences, R. Wilson, F. Keil, Eds. (MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1999), pp. 758-760
From: ScienceWeek
http://scienceweek.com
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